In different industries, such as automobiles, chemicals, or retailing, competitors are joining forces in establishing electronic marketplaces in order to reduce inefficiencies in the purchasing process and cut the costs, by combining their buying power. Joining such an alliance leads to reduced costs, including those of possible rivals, since members share the development and operating costs. A company that joins an alliance agrees to share its suppliers with others, which may lead to a more intense competition among the increased number of suppliers, and it may further benefit an alliance member at the expense of companies left outside the alliance. Natural questions that could arise are, then, when would a firm prefer to take part in an electronic marketplace joint venture, when would it prefer that other firms, possibly rivals, join the venture, and what are the financial consequences of either joining an alliance or remaining independent? In an attempt to gain a better understanding of the issues, we have developed a model of three retailers whose products may have certain degree of substitutability. We provide some conditions, in terms of product substitutability and compatibilty of retailers, which would lead to the formation of a three member alliance, or a two member alliance, or no alliance at all. We also study the effect of alliance structure and compatibilty of retailers on the profit of a company.
Introduction
After its initial boom in the year 2000, which was followed by a period of a somewhat slower growth, business-to-business commerce is again getting stronger in the year 2002. While the volume of B2B commerce in 2000 was $226 billion, eMarketer, a provider of Internet and ebusiness statistics, estimates that it reached $449 billion in 2001
1 . Many researchers predict Thus, alliance membership leads to reduced costs, since members share the development and operation costs, and a larger marketplace may also lead to a more intense competition among the increased number of suppliers. In addition, an alliance member may further benefit at the expense of companies left outside the alliance. On the other hand, alliance membership may reduce the costs of possible rivals and may compromise a company's confidential information on, e.g., product innovation and new products introduction. Some natural questions that could then arise are when would a firm prefer to take part in an electronic marketplace joint venture, when would it prefer that other firms, possibly rivals, join the venture, and what are the financial consequences of either joining an alliance or remaining independent?
In an attempt to gain a better understanding of the issues, we have constructed a model with three companies, wherein a certain degree of substitutability may exist between the products of any two companies. In particular, we provide some conditions, in terms of product substitutability and compatibilty of retailers, that lead to the formation of an alliance of all three retailers, or the alliance of only two retailers, or the case where no alliance is formed because all retailers prefer to act independently. We also study the effect of alliance structure and compatibilty of retailers on the profit of a company.
In our model, we assume that demands are linear and deterministic, and that all retailers have complete information. This is clearly a great simplification, but we believe it can be used for an initial approach to the problem. We note that our analysis can be extended to more general strategic alliances, in which membership in an alliance leads to a decrease in input prices and/or operating costs.
Although there is a large body of literature on strategic alliances, as far as we know, there is not much written about alliance formation in on-line exchanges. For some related work on supply chain contracting and supplier coalitions in electronic markets, see Wu (2000, 2001) . For an analysis of general strategic alliances, see, e.g., Lewis (1990) , and for an analysis of alliances in the airline industry, see, e.g., Oum et al. (2000) .
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present our model with three retailers of possibly substitutable products, where the demand functions are obtained as natural extensions of the demand functions used in the two-retailers model introduced
by McGuire and Staelin (1983) . In Section 3 we study the changes in a retailer's profit as a function of the substitutability levels among products, compatibilty of retailers, and market structure. Section 4 analyzes retailers' preference for a partner in a two-retailer alliance. Section 5 briefly introduces, as stability criteria, the farsighted coalitional stability and the largest consistent set, which are subsequently used in our analysis. In Section 6, we characterize some stable alliance structures for the model without side payments for some special cases, wherein all products are either non-substitutable or highly substitutable, and briefly discuss a model wherein side payments are allowed. In Section 7, we demonstrate that our results shed some light on the issues discussed above, and we further discuss the applicability of our results to more general situations with more than three retailers.
The Model
We are presenting a model with three retailers, where the demand functions are obtained as natural extensions of the demand functions used in the model of two retailers with possibly substitutable products and deterministic and linear demands, introduced by McGuire and Staelin (1983) . Following their notation, let S represent a scale factor corresponding to the industry demand when the prices of all products are set to zero, while the µ's and θ's represent two aspects of product differentiation -the absolute difference in demands and the substitutability of two products, respectively. Changes in µ's alter the relative product preferences, while changes in θ's affect the substitutability of the two products. When θ ij = 0, products i and j have independent demands; product substitutability increases with θ ij , and they become highly substitutable as θ ij → 1. The demand functions are given by:
with i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that 0 ≤ µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ≤ 1, µ 1 + µ 2 + µ 3 = 1, β > 0, S > 0, and 0 ≤ θ ij < 1. Hereafter we assume that the use of notation i, j, k implies i = j = k = i.
Notice that when there is no substitutability among the products, the term within the brackets reduces to 1 − βp i , which corresponds to the standard demand for a single product.
Similarly, when k is not substitutable by the two remaining products, i and j, the equations for q i and q j coincide with the demand functions in the McGuire-Staelin model.
We are assuming that the demands q i are non-negative, which leads to the following assumption about the retailers' profits.
Assumption 1
The profit realized by each retailer (in any alliance structure) is non-negative,
Following the lead of McGuire-Staelin, we rescale the model in order to reduce the number of variables. Thus, let
In this section, we study the effects that the formation of an alliance has on the profits of the retailers. We will show that changes in their profits depend on the level of substitutability among products, retailers' compatibility, reflected through the relative decreases in wholesale prices stemming from alliance memberships, and on the market structure.
On-line procurement decreases the labor and paperwork costs significantly, making it beneficial for companies to move their transactions on-line. Goldman-Sachs estimates (Helper and MacDuffie, 2000) that electronic procurement results in savings of more than 7% on purchased parts and 4.4% of the total cost for a $20,000 car, while Ford claims that it has recouped its initial investment in Covisint by July 1, 2001
10 . The formation of an alliance may result in some further benefits for its members. Collaboration results in a lower share of development and operating costs. The retailers in an alliance agree to "share" their suppliers.
Thus, retailers within an alliance have access to a larger pool of suppliers, which may cause an additional decrease in their individual wholesale prices. The use of an auction model for some of the purchases may further cut the wholesale prices, due to an increased competition among the suppliers. In the reminder of the paper, for simplicity of presentation, a decrease in wholesale prices resulting from alliance membership is assumed to incorporate as well the decrease in processing, development, and operating costs resulting from such membership.
The above discussion motivates the following Observation.
Observation 3 Upon the formation of an alliance in an Internet-based supply exchange, the wholesale prices for all retailers within that alliance strictly decrease 11 .
Notice that this does not imply that each retailer's profit increases. However, since the coefficients of all wholesale prices, w j , in the expression for a retail price, p i , in (3) are nonnegative, with the coefficient of w i being strictly positive, the retail prices of all retailers decrease (strictly decrease, for alliance members) upon the formation of an alliance.
In the remainder of the paper, we denote by {(ijk)} the alliance of all retailers, and by {(ij), k} the alliance between retailers i and j, with retailer k remaining independent.
{(ij), k} will be called a paired structure, retailers i and j will be called paired retailers, while retailer k will be referred to as the unpaired retailer. {i, j, k} will denote an alliance structure wherein all retailers are independent, and it will be called the independent structure.
Two-Retailer Alliance
We start our analysis by considering the formation of an alliance between two of the three existing retailers. Let us consider the pairing of retailers i and j, that is, the structure {(ij), k}. Then, both w i and w j strictly decrease, hence we can replace w i by w i − ∆ 
The profit for retailer i increases upon pairing with j, when the current structure changes from {i, j, k} to {(ij), k}, whenever Π ij i − Π i ≥ 0. This difference in profits is given by
Analysis of some special cases. We now consider some special cases, wherein θ ij = 0 or θ ij → 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Namely, we concentrate on the following four cases:
Let us first assume that all products are highly substitutable. That is, θ ij → 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which corresponds to (d). Then,
α − A i → 10, and B k → 5. Therefore, it follows from (7) that i's profit increases in the alliance (ij) if the decrease in his wholesale price is at least as large as one half of j's wholesale
In general, let us denote non-substitutability between products i and j (θ ij = 0) by N S, and high substitutability of i and j (θ ij → 1) by HS. Then, Table 1 provides conditions for an increase in a retailer's profit, as a function of the relative decreases in wholesale prices of both alliance members.
( Table 1 here.)
We note that, due to symmetry, categories (a ik ) and (a jk ) in Table 1 Therefore, these cases will be omitted from subsequent tables.
In the remainder of this paper, we say that retailers i and j are compatible if their pairing
Proposition 4 Suppose θ ij = 0 or θ ij → 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, retailers i and j are compatible if and only if any one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) product i is non-substitutable by either j or k,
(ii) products i and j are not substitutable, the third product, k, is highly substitutable by both i and j, and 5∆ 
Three-Retailer Alliance
Let us now consider the formation of an alliance of all three retailers. The addition of another retailer to an alliance of two retailers, which increases the pool of suppliers and results in a smaller share of the development and maintenance costs, results in a decrease of the wholesale prices for all three retailers. Further, we make the following additional reasonable assumption that a reduction in one retailer's wholesale price in an alliance of all three retailers is smaller than the sum of the reductions he realizes in both paired alliances.
Formally, if we denote by ∆ i > 0 the reduction in retailer's i wholesale price in the alliance of all retailers, we have:
The profit for retailer i in the alliance (ijk) is given by
Let us assume the existence of an alliance, (ij), and let us analyze the changes in the retailers' profits when retailer k joins this alliance. The difference between i's profit in {(ij), k} and his profit in {(ijk)} is given by
while the difference between k's profits in the alliances {(ij), k} and {(ijk)} is given by
, while k's profit increases upon joining the alliance of the remaining two retailers if
The results for the special cases, wherein θ ij = 0 or θ ij → 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are summarized in Table 2. ( Table 2 here.)
Observe that similar results hold when the current structure is the independent structure, {i, j, k}, and the retailers consider the formation of the alliance of all retailers, {(ijk)}. One only needs to replace ∆ i − ∆ Table 3 .
( Table 3 here.)
Preference for a Partner
In this section, we analyze retailers' preferences for a formation of a two-retailer alliance.
We subsequently study some cases wherein a retailer may prefer to participate in a certain paired alliance in which his profit decreases, in order to prevent the formation of a different paired alliance, wherein he would be the unpaired retailer and realize even smaller profits.
Preference for a Partner in a Two-Retailer Alliance
Retailer i prefers pairing with j rather than with k, hereafter denoted by (ik) i (ij), if it results in a higher profit for i (i.e. Π ij i ≥ Π ik i ). From (6) , this condition corresponds to
It follows from Assumption 1 that i's profit is larger in {(ij), k} than in {(ik), j} if Table 1 , categories (c ik ) and (c jk ), that, when products i and j are not substitutable, while k is highly substitutable by both i and j, k always prefers staying independent to pairing with any of the retailers. Thus, we need not consider this case. The conditions for the remaining players' preferences are summarized in Table 4 .
It follows from
( Table 4 here.)
In the following subsection, we analyze the cases wherein a retailer i may prefer being in a paired alliance (ij) to being the unpaired retailer, even if it results in a decrease of his profit,
Participation in a Two-Retailer Alliance when Profit Decreases
Let us now assume that i's profit strictly decreases upon pairing with j (Π 
The following Proposition will be used in the subsequent analysis.
Proposition 6
The profit that retailer i can realize as the unpaired retailer is always smaller than his profit in the independent structure. That is,
Proof: It follows from Observation 3 that the wholesale prices for retailers j and k decrease upon the formation of the alliance (jk). Consequently, Proposition 2 implies that i's profit decreases.
Thus, whenever i's profit increases upon pairing with j (Π ij i ≥ Π i ), Proposition 6 implies that i prefers {(ij), k} to {(jk), i}. On the other hand, when Π jk i ≤ Π ij i < Π i and j may decide to join k if an alliance of i and j is not formed, it is more profitable for retailer i to join j than to allow the formation of the alliance (jk), wherein his profit would be lower. To determine the conditions for Π jk i ≤ Π ij i , consider the inequality
The following Proposition summarizes the results for the special cases.
Proposition 7 Suppose θ ij = 0 or θ ij → 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, when the profit for retailer i strictly decreases in the alliance structure {(ij), k}, he still prefers this alliance structure to being the unpaired retailer if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) Product i is highly substitutable by product j, k is not substitutable by either of the two remaining products, and
2) All products are highly substitutable, and
Proof: See Appendix.
Stability Criteria
In Section 3, we have analyzed changes in retailers' profits resulting from the formation of an alliance. Some individual rationality constraints and some stability conditions need to be satisfied in order for all alliance members to agree to participate and to stay in that alliance.
The framework we use to study these conditions is cooperative game theory.
A pair (N, v) , where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, and v : 2 N → IR is a function such that v(∅) = 0, is called a cooperative game with side payments. A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition, N is called the grand coalition, and v is called the characteristic function of the game. A coalition structure, B, is a partition on N . That is,
A mapping Φ which assigns to every cooperative game (N, v) a subset
Since all retailers in our problem can communicate among themselves, we may expect that they will consider both unilateral deviations from given coalition structures and joint deviations by coalitions. Unfortunately, most solution concepts used for analyzing stability of coalition structures (core (Gillies, 1959) , coalition structure core (Aumann and Dreze, 1974) , strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) ) preclude the possibility that once the players decide to deviate, there may be further deviations, or they do not take into account the possibility that some members of a deviating coalition may further deviate with members outside that coalition (coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) ). For an approach to overcome the "nestedness" restriction in Bernheim et al. (1987) , see Xue (2000) .
A solution concept that allows players to look ahead and consider possible further deviations, and which considers deviations by coalitions where subcoalitions may further deviate with players outside that coalition, is the largest consistent set, introduced by Chwe (1994) .
It is defined below, and is used as a stability criterion in our analysis of stable alliance structures. Let us denote by ≺ i the players' strong preference relations, described as follows: for two coalition structures, B 1 and and has the merit of "ruling out with confidence". For a more detailed analysis of farsighted coalitional stability, see Chwe (1994) . Xue (1998) has refined Chwe's LCS by introducing the notion of perfect foresight. Finally, for a recent survey on coalition formation see Greenberg (1994) , and for a recent analysis of stability in oligopoly markets using Chwe's LCS criterion see Masuda, Suzuki, and Muto (2000) .
Stable Coalition Structures
In this section, we characterize a stable alliance structure as a function of product substitutability and reduction in wholesale prices due to alliance membership. We only consider the cases where either θ ij = 0 or θ ij → 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, but the analysis can easily be extended to arbitrary values of the θ ij 's. There are three possible stable alliance structures we need to consider: an alliance of all three retailers (the grand coalition), a two-retailer alliance (a paired structure), and the case where all the retailers act independently (the independent structure). Due to practical difficulties that may arise in calculating the exact benefits that may be realized by each retailer from a membership in an alliance, and, consequently, difficulties 12 of determining the amounts of side payments among the alliance members, and perhaps because of possible legal restrictions, it appears that an alliance model without side payments is the one prevalent in real life. An example of such a model is Covisint, which operates as an independent business in which GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler have equal ownership. Therefore, we consider here an alliance model without side payments among the retailers. A brief discussion of a model with side payments is given in Subsection 6.2.
A Model without Side Payments
When all products are non-substitutable, the only stable structure is the alliance of all retailers. Indeed, it follows from Tables 1 and 2 that the grand coalition would yield the largest profit for each one of the retailers. Thus, they all have an incentive for a joint deviation from any other coalition structure to the grand coalition. Formally, we have:
Theorem 8 When none of the products are substitutable, the LCS contains a single stable point, the grand coalition {(ijk)}.
It is, therefore, always beneficial for retailers to participate in the grand coalition if their products are not substitutable. Examples of such alliances are those between Oracle, Sears, and the French retailer Carrefour, or corProcure, the horizontal e-marketplace established by Australia's leading companies, among which are Amcor (cartonboard), AMP (finance), Australia Post, Coca-Cola (soft drinks), Foster's (beer), Quantas (airline), and others.
Before we proceed, we need the following definition. When there are no pairs of players who prefer each other to the third player, i.e., (ik) i (ij) j (jk) k (ik) hold, we will denote it by [ijk] and call it circular preferences. Finally, recall that Table 4 summarizes preference conditions for two-member alliances.
Theorem 8 describes the only case where the alliance of all three retailers is the unique stable structure. Theorems 9, 11 and 12 describe some other instances wherein some of the products are substitutable and the grand coalition may be one of several potentially stable structures. The proof of Theorem 9 is presented in the Appendix. Proofs of are similar to that of Theorem 9, and are therefore omitted. They can be obtained upon request from the authors.
Let us start by analyzing the case with two highly substitutable products, where the third product is non-substitutable by either of the remaining two products.
Theorem 9 When two products, j and k, are highly substitutable, and the third product, i, is non-substitutable by either of the remaining two products (θ ij = θ ik = 0, θ jk → 1), then:
(1) If i and j prefer each other to retailer k, {(ij), k} is in the LCS 13 .
(2) If circular preferences [ijk] hold, then:
(a) If k prefers being the unpaired retailer to pairing with the retailer he least prefers, j, {(ij), k} is in the LCS 14 .
(b) Otherwise, if k is indifferent between being the unpaired retailer and pairing with j, the LCS contains all paired structures, {(ij), k}, {(jk), i}, and {(ik), j} 15 .
Next, consider the case with two non-substitutable products, where the third product is highly substitutable by both remaining products. It leads to the following result.
Theorem 10 When two products, i and j, are not substitutable, and the third product, k, is highly substitutable by both i and j (θ ij = 0, θ ik = θ jk = θ → 1), the LCS contains a single stable structure {(ij), k}, whenever i and j are compatible. Otherwise, if i and j are not compatible, the unique stable coalition structure is the independent structure {i, j, k}.
Observe that there is always a unique stable structure for this case, and it is never the grand coalition. Lastly, let us assume that all products are highly substitutable, and consider the case with a pair of retailers who both prefer each other to pairing with the remaining retailer.
Theorem 11 When all products are highly substitutable, and there is a pair of retailers, i and j, who prefer each other to the third retailer, k, then:
(1) If i and j are compatible, then {(ij), k} is in the LCS 16 .
(2) If i and j are not compatible, while i and k are compatible, then:
(a) If j prefers pairing with i to being the unpaired retailer, {(ij), k} is in the LCS.
(b) Otherwise, if j prefers being the unpaired retailer to pairing with i, the unique stable coalition structure is {(ik), j}.
(3) If there are no pairs of compatible retailers, the unique stable coalition structure is the independent structure {i, j, k}.
Thus, in view of Theorem 11 and footnote 16, when all products are highly substitutable, and there is a pair of retailers who both prefer each other to pairing with the remaining retailer, the grand coalition is in the LCS if and only if i and j are compatible and all retailers benefit equally from participation in the grand coalition. When there is no pair of retailers preferring each other, we have:
Theorem 12 When all products are highly substitutable, and circular preferences [ijk] hold, the LCS is defined as follows:
(1) If there is at least one pair of compatible retailers, then:
(a) If all retailers prefer pairing with the retailer they least prefer to being the unpaired retailer, then the LCS contains all paired structures, {(ij), k}, {(ik), j}, and {(jk), i} 17 .
(b) If exactly one retailer, k, prefers being the unpaired retailer to pairing with the retailer he least prefers, then {(ij), k} is in the LCS 18 .
(c) If both retailers i and k prefer being unpaired to pairing with the retailer they least prefer, the unique stable coalition structure is obtained by pairing of compatible retailers, 
Observation 14
We note that, in the presence of circular preferences, all paired structures may be contained in the LCS. This may seem somewhat too inclusive, which may motivate the implementation of a more refined solution concept. One possible alternative could be the farsighted von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, which is always contained in the LCS (Chwe, 1994) . The definition of the farsighted von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set is obtained by replacing direct dominance with indirect dominance in the definition of the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953) . Thus, a set S is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable if for any x, y ∈ S, x y (internal stability), and for any x ∈ S c , there is a y ∈ S such that x y (external stability). Consider the case described in Theorem 12 (1)(a), wherein all three paired structures are contained in the LCS. Each of the paired structures is directly (and therefore, also indirectly) dominated by exactly one other paired structure. Thus, in this case (which is logically similar to Condorcet paradox), the stable set will be empty: it cannot contain two (or more) paired structures, since it would violate the internal stability constraint, and it cannot contain only one element, since it violates the external stability constraint. A similar conclusion can be derived for the case described in Theorem 9 (2)(b), wherein the LCS also contains all three paired structures.
Therefore, the use of a more refined farsighted solution concept, based on a von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set, appears to be too restrictive in the case with circular preferences.
A Model with Side Payments
We briefly consider in this subsection a model wherein side payments among the alliance members are allowed. Allowing retailers to make side payments is equivalent to letting them decide on how the entire profit realized by an alliance should be allocated among its members.
That is, for any alliance, A, the retailers in that alliance should select an allocation rule, ϕ, where ϕ i , i ∈ A, denotes the share of the total profit, j∈A Π A j , allocated to retailer i. It is reasonable to impose some restrictions, such as efficiency and individual rationality, on the allocation rules under consideration. That is, an allocation rule should allocate the entire profit realized by the alliance, and it should allocate to each retailer at least the amount which he can realize on his own. The profit a retailer, i, can achieve on his own has to be carefully modeled. It could be either Π In general, the theory of coalitional form games has been mostly concerned, and quite successful in the characterization and computation of allocation rules (e.g., core, nucleolus, Shapley value) for a given coalitional structure (i.e., a partition of the player set), and it was less successful in providing convincing explanations for the actual formation of coalitional structures. Moreover, the LCS has been found to be least satisfactory for coalitional form games (Chwe, 1994) . Nevertheless, let us briefly consider the LCS in this context.
If we analyze a model with side payments as a coalitional form game, the effectiveness relation is defined in the following way: for two arbitrary efficient allocations, ϕ and ν, we 
, 2, 3}. While the core for this game is empty, since it requires ϕ i + ϕ j ≥ 1, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 + ϕ 3 = 1, the LCS consists of all efficient and individually rational allocations. Thus, in our model with three retailers, the grand coalition is always stable when side payments are allowed. A paired structure may be stable if the total profit realized by all retailers does not strictly increase when the unpaired retailer joins the existing two-retailer alliance, while the independent structure is never stable. We note, however, that, in general, it is difficult to find closed-form expressions for the allocations that are contained in the LCS.
Another, technically simpler approach could be to use non-farsighted concepts in order to identify stable alliance structures. Thus, for example, one could study games in coalitional forms (Aumann and Dreze, 1974) , to identify stable alliance structures which would correspond to coalitional structures whose core is not empty. This approach, though, may lead to situations in which there is no stable alliance structure. For instance, one could easily show that for the example considered in the previous paragraph, there is no coalitional structure whose core is not empty.
We conclude that analyzing and identifying stable alliance structures using the coalitional form game paradigm may lead to substantially different conclusions than those reached in the previous subsection. The concluding remarks presented in the next section are based on the results derived for the model without side payments, analyzed in Subsection 6.1.
Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper was to provide a better understanding for the motivation behind the formation of alliances and the benefits that an alliance provides to its members. For that purpose, we have studied the effect of formation of an alliance on the profits of retailers in the marketplace, and we provided conditions for stability of alliance structures among three or fewer retailers of possibly substitutable products.
We have shown that in the model wherein all pairs of products are non-substitutable, the alliance of all retailers is the only stable set. However, once some of the retailers have substitutable products, this is not the case anymore. Thus, for example, when only one pair, say i and j, of the products (out of the three pairs) is not substitutable, the alliance of all three retailers is never in the LCS. Rather, in this case either the alliance of i and j or the independent structure is a stable set. Similarly, when all products are highly substitutable, the alliance of all three retailers is in the LCS only when all retailers benefit precisely equally from that alliance. The more likely solutions in the LCS are a paired alliance, when there exists a pair of compatible retailers, or the independent structure wherein no alliance is formed, if all retailers are incompatible.
Although there are only three retailers in our model, we feel that our results can provide some insight into more general cases. Indeed, if all the retailers have non-substitutable products, we can infer that the highest profit for each one of the retailers would be realized in the alliance of all retailers. When retailers have both non-substitutable and highly substitutable products, it appears that an alliance of all retailers whose products are non-substitutable, in which some compatibility conditions among the retailers are satisfied, should benefit all its participants. Finally, if all retailers have highly substitutable products, an alliance of all compatible retailers appears to be in the LCS. In addition, if all retailers benefit equally from the formation of the grand coalition (in terms of reduction in their wholesale prices), the alliance of all retailers could be stable as well.
As it should be evident from our analysis, the absolute decrease in wholesale prices and processing costs has a relatively minor effect on the profit firms realize by forming or expanding an alliance, and, as a result, on the alliance stability. Indeed, a firm may realize a decrease in its wholesale prices and processing costs by, for example, joining an alliance, and still have its profit decrease as a result of joining this alliance. It is the relative decrease in wholesale prices and processing costs, as presented in Tables 1-3 , which should be monitored to determine the benefits and wisdom of either forming, joining, or expanding an alliance.
A majority of exchanges today are vertical exchanges, formed along specific industries.
They may be privately owned by a single company (e.g., BMW or Volkswagen), or they may be owned by several industry leaders (e.g. Covisint). Our results for the model with high substitutability among all products show that an alliance of all retailers is not always stable.
It may be stable only if it provides equal benefits to all its participants. Thus, for instance, if there is a new company, which benefits significantly more from a membership in an alliance than the other participants, the grand coalition is never stable. A similar conclusion can be made if one of the potential alliance members is a well established company, which would benefit significantly less than the other participants.
GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler are the three largest companies in the automotive industry. Each of them has been present in the market for a long time, sells several millions vehicles per year, and possesses manufacturing facilities in various countries. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that each company has a pool of good suppliers, has equally efficient processes for dealing with its suppliers, and that their alliance would generate reductions in wholesale prices that are close to being equal. We can also assume that there is a high substitutability among their products. Under these assumptions, the profitability from membership in the alliance of all three of them, along with the possible stability of this alliance, are consistent with our results. We note, however, that BMW and VW have decided to build their individual marketplaces and not join the Big Three. This may imply that BMW and VW believe that their benefits from alliance membership would be smaller compared to those of other alliance members. However, other, idiosyncratic reasons may justify their decision as well 21 -security concerns, mode of relationship with suppliers, a prior dispute between VW and GM (involving a former GM executive), or BMW's unsuccessful partnership with Rover.
We have also seen that some major electronic companies, such as Sun Microsystems, prefer not to join their rivals in the formation of Internet marketplaces. While the Big Three automakers can benefit from increased competition among the thousands of auto-part suppliers, the PC business is dominated by roughly thirty customers and thirty major suppliers.
Adding to that the fact that component prices are already very low, some PC makers, such as Sun Microsystems, believe that they can benefit more from supply chain improvements than from decreasing suppliers' profit margins 22 . Further, while alliance membership may still lead to a significant cost reduction, through sharing the cost of developing and maintaining the supply exchange, a company such as Sun may feel that membership in a public exchange may compromise some of its confidential information regarding the timing of new products introduction and products specification, which may result with a decrease in Sun's leadership in product innovation and may reduce customers' relative preference for Sun's products 23 . Thus, Sun may be reluctant to participate in an alliance with its rivals, where there is a high level of substitutability among products, because it may feel that its benefits from the alliance membership would not be high enough to compensate for potential losses stemming from losing its leadership position in product innovation.
It should be noted that our model has not incorporated a possible reaction by the suppliers, some of whom, quite likely, will see their profit margins reduce substantially due to the introduction of electronic exchanges. It appears reasonable that the suppliers, in general, would prefer not to deal with a single exchange which incorporates all the major producers in the industry. Indeed, such an exchange would limit the options available to suppliers, and would force them, at least for some time, to "play" by the exchange rules. In that respect, the encouragement 21 provided by some suppliers who, in order to save some information technology and related cost, have urged the Big Three car manufacturers to cease the development of individual exchanges and embark on developing a common electronic exchange seems to be unwise. On their part, the Big Three, perhaps in order to limit the suppliers' options, appear to prefer 21 that all car manufacturers join Covisint. Our analysis reveals that, in general, a relatively small or less efficient car manufacturer would benefit from joining Covisint, but the inclusion of such a member could possibly decrease the profits of the bigger manufacturers in this exchange.
As mentioned earlier, our paper represents an initial attempt to obtain some insights into the motivation behind the formation of alliances. Some of the assumptions made in this model, such as linear and deterministic demand, or complete information, are rather restrictive, and their relaxation can provide an interesting area for future research. We believe that this subject is becoming increasingly important with the advancements in B2B
exchanges.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7: It follows from 
not substitutable by both remaining products, j and k, while j and k are highly substitutable (θ ij = θ ik = 0, θ jk → 1). Whenever products i and j are not substitutable, while k is highly substitutable by both i and j (θ ij = 0, θ ik = θ jk = θ → 1), it follows from Table 1 (c ik ) and (c jk ) that retailer k never has an incentive to pair with i or j. Since this implies that the formation of the alliances (ik) or (jk) is unlikely, neither i nor j needs to consider their mutual pairing, described in Table 1 (c ij ), in order to prevent the other player's pairing with k. Therefore, none of these cases needs to be considered here.
(1) If product i is not substitutable by either j or k (θ ij = θ ik = 0), while j and k are highly substitutable (θ jk → 1), and ∆ imply that 1 is compatible with both 2 and 3. Without loss of generality, let us assume (13) 1 (12).
(1) Observe that by (13) , and because we assumed that (13) 1 (12), circular preferences [123] hold. This case is handled in the second part of the proof, and thus we will assume that (23) ≺ 2 (12).
Paired structures. Since (13) 1 (12), neither 1 nor 2 want to secede from {(12), 3}, unless all retailers can strictly increase their profits in the grand coalition. Because both 1 and 2 benefit from their joint deviation to {(12), 3}, neither {(13), 2} nor {(23), 1} are stable, unless 1 is indifferent between 2 and 3. In the latter case, since 1 and 3 are compatible, {(13), 2} is also in the LCS.
Independent structure {1, 2, 3}. Since 1 is compatible with both 2 and 3, a joint deviation of, e.g., 1 and 2 benefits both retailers, hence {1, 2, 3} is unstable.
Grand coalition {(123)}. It follows from Table 2 (b ij ) and (b ik ), and Table 3 Consider first the case ∆ 2 − ∆ 12 2 > ∆ 3 . From Table 2 (b ij ), this implies {(123)} ≺ 3 {(12), 3}.
Thus, since being unpaired is better for 3 than the grand coalition, a deviation {(123)} 3 {(12), 3} strictly increases 3's profit. Therefore, since {(12), 3} 3 {1, 2, 3}, we can conclude that the grand coalition is not stable.
Next, assume ∆ 2 −∆ formation of the alliance (23). Since (23) ≺ 3 (13) , and 1 is compatible with 3, both 1 and 3 benefit from a further deviation, {(12), 3} 2,3 {(23), 1} 1,3 {(13), 2}. This results in a decrease of 2's profit, hence 2's original deviation is deterred by a joint deviation of 1 and 3.
Thus, {(12), 3} is in the LCS, unless all retailers strictly increase their profits by deviating to the grand coalition. Similar analysis shows that the remaining two paired structures are also in the LCS.
Independent structure {1, 2, 3}. Instability follows from, e.g., the compatibility of 1 and 2.
Grand coalition {(123)}. Similarly as in part (1) (1) of this proof shows that the grand coalition cannot be stable.
